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Many governments offer incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). For 
example, the renewable energy sector has benefitted from large national incentive 
schemes in the past decade. However, the withdrawal of such incentives can lead to 
investors bringing investment treaty claims against host countries. This Perspective 
looks at some claims host countries face from investors in the renewable energy 
sector and their implications.  
 
Since 2010, some countries have significantly revised their energy sector incentive 
schemes, substantially withdrawing incentives and linking the remaining incentives to 
local content requirements. The alleged detrimental effects of these changes for 
investors in solar energy generation have been the basis of a wave of investment 
treaty claims. At least seven cases have been brought against the Czech Republic
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another seven cases against Spain.
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Solar investors claim that their businesses are no longer viable because of these 
measures, which they allege are contrary to pre-reform legislative and regulatory 
commitments. As such, countries that have passed these measures are said to be in 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard and, possibly, treaty 
provisions on expropriation. 
 
These cases—particularly those claiming that there has been a violation of the FET 
standard—raise a classic issue in investment arbitration, pitting foreign investors' 
reliance on stable regulations that provide a framework for their long-term 
investments against the host country’s right to adapt regulations to new needs.4 What 
measure of protection, as a matter of international law, should be granted to investors' 
expectations that they will continue to receive the same level of incentives? This 
might be difficult for a tribunal to determine, especially when investors' expectations 
arise out of legislative provisions and/or normative regulations of general application 
that are not shielded from subsequent amendments, and there are no specific 
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In the cases against the Czech Republic, investors are challenging the introduction of 
a new retroactive tax on solar arrays and other sector-specific measures as contrary to 
the standards of protection under international investment agreements (IIAs).  
 
Most European IIAs concluded in the 1990s did not include carve-outs for tax 
measures, but the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a prominent exception. Cases 
brought under the ECT can raise questions related to the scope of the taxation carve-
out in ECT Article 21. That Article begins with providing that: "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this Article, nothing in this Treaty shall create rights or impose 
obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties. In the event 
of any inconsistency between this Article and any other provision of the Treaty, this 
Article shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." Article 21 creates an 
exception by providing that the most-favored-nation obligation in Article 10(7) does 
not apply to certain tax arrangements and measures (paragraph 3), but no exception 
for the FET standard. Furthermore, Article 21(5) establishes a special procedural 
mechanism for investors to claim the expropriatory or confiscatory nature of tax 
measures. Respondents in ECT cases can therefore be expected to rely on Article 21, 
arguing for a broad interpretation of Article 21(1) and a narrow application of the 
exceptions thereto. 
 
The cases on solar energy incentives illustrate the pros and cons of national incentive 
programs. On one hand, generous national incentive schemes may help attract FDI; 
on the other hand, subsequent changes to incentive schemes affecting foreign 
investors might be challenged under IIAs, with host countries facing the risk of being 
overwhelmed with investment arbitration claims. 
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